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Nondiscrimination and Religious Affiliation: The 
Ninth Circuit Upholds the Denial of Registered 
Status to a Christian Student Club in Alpha Delta 
Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[E]galitarianism has become one of the most commanding 
drives in U.S. higher education, a nearly ubiquitous pressure on 
every segment of and activity in academe.”1 As egalitarian programs 
in higher education have become more prevalent, constitutional 
challenges to those programs have likewise increased.2 Recently, 
Hastings Law School adopted a nondiscrimination policy that denied 
registered status to any student club that refused to adopt an all-
comers policy, meaning that clubs could not restrict membership on 
any basis.3 As a result, the university denied recognized status to a 
Christian club that required its members to espouse Christian 
beliefs.4 The club challenged the policy in Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez but lost.5 The Supreme Court, for prudential reasons, 
declined to address the constitutionality of a policy that would deny 
registered status only to groups that discriminated on particular 
bases.6 
In Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the very question that the Supreme Court left unanswered 
in Christian Legal Society.7 The Ninth Circuit analyzed the 
constitutionality of San Diego State University’s nondiscrimination 
 
 1. GEORGE KELLER, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE NEW SOCIETY 84 (2008). 
 2. See Frank A. Schmidtlein & Robert O. Berdahl, Autonomy and Accountability, in 
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND 
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 83 (Philip G. Atbach et al. eds., 2011) (noting that “[r]ecourse to 
the courts to settle disputes has increased greatly during the past four decades,” due in part to 
affirmative action in admissions); see, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 3. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 
(2010). 
 4. Id. at 2980. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 2984 n.10. 
 7. 648 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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policy, which allows student groups to discriminate on any basis 
except for prohibited criteria—race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 
and others.8 Two Christian SDSU clubs sued, arguing that the policy 
violated their First Amendment rights of speech, expressive 
association, and free exercise of religion.9 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
these claims, relying on its own precedent and on Christian Legal 
Society.10 
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Christian Legal Society was 
misplaced because the Supreme Court strongly distinguished a policy 
like the one at SDSU, which prohibits only some forms of 
discrimination. In addition, the Ninth Circuit failed to reconcile its 
decision with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rosenberger v. Rector 
and Visitors of the University of Virginia11 and erred by holding that 
SDSU’s policy was viewpoint-neutral. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
SDSU operates a student organization program in which clubs 
can apply for recognized status,12 a designation that provides various 
university benefits, including funding, rights to use the university’s 
logo and name, use of university rooms and office space, and 
publicity in school publications at no cost.13 The plaintiffs in the case 
were a Christian sorority, Alpha Delta Chi, and a Christian fraternity, 
Alpha Gamma Omega.14 The plaintiffs applied for recognized status, 
but the university denied the applications because of the clubs’ 
requirement that members profess Christian beliefs.15 That 
requirement, according to university administrators, violated the 
school’s nondiscrimination policy, which reads: 
On-campus status will not be granted to any student organization 
whose application is incomplete or restricts membership or 
eligibility to hold appointed or elected student officer positions in 
the campus-recognized chapter or group on the basis of race, sex, 
 
 8. Id. at 796. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 803. 
 11. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 12. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 796. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 795. 
 15. Id. at 796. 
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color, age, religion, national origin, marital status, sexual 
orientation, physical or mental handicap, ancestry, or medical 
condition, except as explicitly exempted under federal law.16 
Thus, unlike officially recognized clubs, the plaintiffs had to pay 
to use university buildings for events and meetings.17 Additionally, 
although the plaintiffs could distribute flyers and try to recruit 
members, they had to stay in areas open to anyone, “such as the ‘free 
speech steps’ of the student union and the wall next to the university 
bookstore.”18 
There was strong evidence that this policy was not applied 
uniformly to all organizations at SDSU.19 Although the university 
denied plaintiffs’ applications because of their religious requirement, 
the university had granted recognized status to other religious 
student groups that had similar requirements, including a group 
called the Catholic Newman Center.20 Furthermore, the school 
officially recognized some nonreligious student groups that 
discriminated in contravention of the policy, including the African 
Student Drama Association.21 
The plaintiffs brought a suit in federal court,22 arguing that the 
university’s nondiscrimination policy violated their rights of free 
speech, freedom of expressive association, free exercise of religion, 
and equal protection under the law.23 On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and 
granted the defendants’ motion on all counts.24 The plaintiffs then 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.25 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND: FREE SPEECH & 
EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
Because the Ninth Circuit centered most of its analysis on the 
plaintiffs’ free speech and freedom of expressive association claims, 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 803–04. 
 20. Id. at 803. 
 21. Id. at 804. 
 22. Id. at 790. 
 23. Id. at 804. 
 24. Id. at 796. 
 25. Id. 
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this section will discuss the contours of those legal doctrines, 
focusing on cases with facts based in a university setting. This 
analysis tracks the evolution of these two doctrines leading up to 
Christian Legal Society. 
A. Free Speech 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”26 The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean that 
“government may not regulate speech based on its substantive 
content or the message it conveys.”27 Viewpoint discrimination, 
where the government targets “particular views taken by speakers on 
a subject,” is an “egregious form of content discrimination.”28 
Although the First Amendment protects the speech of students 
and faculty on campuses of public universities,29 the right is analyzed 
differently from speech in public forums, such as public parks and 
streets.30 Student-club programs at universities are treated by courts 
as limited public forums.31 Under the limited forum doctrine, in 
which the government provides a forum “that is limited to use by 
certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain 
subjects,” the government can impose reasonable speech restrictions 
that are viewpoint-neutral.32 In a limited forum, the government is 
not obligated to “allow persons to engage in every type of speech.”33 
For example, a government may reserve a forum for use by particular 
speakers or for discussing certain topics so as to confine the forum 
“to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created.”34 
 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 27. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). 
 28. Id. at 829. 
 29. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268–69 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 
180 (1972) (“[W]e note that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the 
sweep of the First Amendment.”). 
 30. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5; see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of The Univ. 
of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 31. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.12. 
 32. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009) (citations 
omitted). 
 33. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). 
 34. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
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Judicial review under the limited public forum doctrine consists 
of two inquiries: (1) whether the regulation is “‘reasonable in light 
of the purpose served by the forum,’” and (2) whether the 
regulation discriminates on a viewpoint basis.35 For example, in 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the 
Supreme Court held that the university violated student publishers’ 
free speech rights by withholding on the basis of the publishers’ 
religious views funding that was available to all other student 
publishers.36 
B. Freedom of Expressive Association 
The right to associate “for the purpose of engaging in those 
activities protected by the First Amendment” is protected by the 
Constitution.37 This associational right is fundamental to the exercise 
of other First Amendment rights because those rights “could not be 
vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a 
correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends 
were not also guaranteed.”38 One way to violate this right is to 
“impose penalties or withhold benefits from individuals because of 
their membership in a disfavored group.”39 Similarly, the right is 
infringed when the government “forces [a] group to accept members 
it does not desire.”40 “Freedom of association therefore plainly 
presupposes a freedom not to associate.”41 
Where a regulation infringes on the right of association, a court 
will uphold the regulation only if it serves “compelling state 
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be 
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms.”42 Thus, in Roberts v. Jaycees, the Supreme Court held that 
although a men-only organization’s expressive association rights had 
been infringed by a state’s requirement that it allow women, the 
state’s interest in eliminating gender discrimination was a compelling 
 
 35. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2988 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829). 
 36. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822–23. 
 37. Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). 
 38. Id. at 622. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 623. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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interest that justified the infringement.43 By contrast, the Supreme 
Court held in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bi-Sexual 
Group that parade organizers’ right of expressive association was 
violated by the application of a state law that required the organizers 
to include a group in the parade with which the parade organizers 
disagreed.44 
C. Combining These Rights: Christian Legal Society 
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Christian Legal Society, 
wherein the Court introduced a new method for analysis of the two 
above rights.45 Because of the similarity between Christian Legal 
Society and Alpha Delta, a brief discussion of the case is included 
here. 
1. Facts of Christian Legal Society 
Like San Diego State University, the Hastings College of Law 
operates a student-organization program in which students can apply 
for recognized status.46 Hastings has in place an “all-comers” 
nondiscrimination policy which requires student groups to “allow 
any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership 
positions in the organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs.”47 
Hastings denied recognized status to a religious student group, the 
Christian Legal Society, because the group allowed membership only 
to those who shared its Christian beliefs.48 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 
(2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts’ right of expressive association was violated by a state law 
that would have required the group to admit “an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist” 
in contravention of its values). 
 45. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 
2985 (2010) (noting that it “makes little sense to treat CLS’s speech and association claims as 
discrete”). 
 46. Id. at 2979. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2980. Their beliefs are included in a Statement of Faith, which reads: 
Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in:  
• One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  
• God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth. 
• The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God’s only Son conceived of the Holy 
Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we 
receive eternal life; His bodily resurrection and personal return. 
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2. Legal analysis in Christian Legal Society 
The Court held that the all-comers policy at Hastings was 
constitutional.49 Noting that the plaintiffs brought claims both for 
freedom of speech and freedom of association, the Court reasoned 
that the claims would best be analyzed together under the limited 
public forum doctrine.50 The Court reasoned that the all-comers 
policy was reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum and that 
the regulation was viewpoint neutral because it drew “no distinction 
between groups based on their message or perspective.”51 
Responding to the plaintiffs’ criticisms of the restrictions, the Court 
reasoned that it had “repeatedly stressed that a State’s restriction on 
access to a limited public forum ‘need not be the most reasonable or 
the only reasonable limitation.’”52 Relying on this reasoning, the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the all-comers policy.53 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
Like the Supreme Court in Christian Legal Society, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld San Diego State University’s nondiscrimination policy 
in Alpha Delta.54 The most important elements of the Ninth 
Circuit’s legal analysis are discussed below. 
A. Christian Legal Society Does Not Control, But It Helps 
The court determined that the holding of Christian Legal Society 
was not controlling because the Supreme Court explicitly declined to 
address the constitutionality of a nondiscrimination policy that 
would apply only against certain groups,55 as does SDSU’s. For 
 
• The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration.  
• The Bible as the inspired Word of God.  
Id. n.3 (quoting App. 226). 
 49. Id. at 2995. 
 50. Id. at 2985. 
 51. Id. at 2993. 
 52. Id. at 2991 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 
788, 808 (1985)). 
 53. Id. at 2995. 
 54. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 55. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 (“This opinion, therefore, considers only 
whether conditioning access to a student-organization forum on compliance with an all-comers 
policy violates the Constitution.”); Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter 648 F.3d at 795. The  
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example, SDSU’s nondiscrimination policy prohibits discrimination 
“on certain specified bases, for example, race, gender, religion, and 
sexual orientation,” but allows discrimination on any other basis.56 
Thus, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to rule on the 
constitutionality of a policy like the one at SDSU. Instead, the Court 
upheld only Hastings’ all-comers policy, which prohibited student 
groups from restricting membership on any basis. Despite the 
significant differences in the policies at issue in Alpha Delta and 
Christian Legal Society, the Ninth Circuit concluded that as a matter 
of constitutional principles, SDSU’s policy was not materially 
different from the all-comers policy in Christian Legal Society.57 
Relying upon this conclusion, the court held that SDSU’s policy was 
constitutional. 
B. No Violation of Expressive Association and Free Speech Rights 
The Ninth Circuit, citing Christian Legal Society, also held that 
SDSU’s student organization program created a limited public 
forum.58 The Ninth Circuit analyzed both the expressive association 
and free speech rights together under the limited public forum 
doctrine, as did the Supreme Court in Christian Legal Society.59 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit limited its analysis to whether the 
nondiscrimination policy was reasonable in light of the purposes of 
the forum and whether the policy was viewpoint neutral.60  
1. Reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum 
In its reasonableness analysis, the Ninth Circuit first examined 
SDSU’s Student Organizations Handbook to determine the purpose 
of the school-sponsored clubs.61 Finding several “references to 
diversity and nondiscrimination,” the court concluded that one of 
the purposes of the student clubs was to “promote diversity and 
 
concurrence agrees that CLS does not control. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F3d at 805 
(Ripple, J., concurring). 
 56. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 795 (majority opinion). 
 57. Id. at 805. 
 58. Id. at 797. 
 59. Id. at 798. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 798–99. 
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nondiscrimination.”62 Thus, the court reasoned that requiring 
student clubs to adhere to the university’s nondiscrimination policy 
was reasonable.63 The Ninth Circuit also found it significant that the 
plaintiffs, like those in Christian Legal Society, had alternative means 
for communication—including social media, email, and websites—
that would compensate for denying them the communicative means 
given to recognized clubs.64 
2. Viewpoint neutrality 
After concluding that the nondiscrimination policy was 
reasonable, the court next analyzed viewpoint neutrality. The 
plaintiffs in Alpha Delta argued that the nondiscrimination policy 
discriminated based on viewpoint, and in the alternative, that the 
policy was discriminatorily applied to them.65 The court disagreed, 
reasoning that “a restriction that ‘serves purposes unrelated to the 
content of expression’ and only incidentally burdens some speakers, 
messages, or viewpoints, ‘is deemed neutral.’”66 The court saw no 
evidence that the university adopted the nondiscrimination policy 
“for the purpose of suppressing Plaintiffs’ viewpoint, or indeed of 
restricting any sort of expression at all.”67 The court further reasoned 
that the university’s policy “does not ‘target speech or discriminate 
on the basis of its content,’ but instead serves to remove access 
barriers imposed against groups that have historically been 
excluded.”68 Relying on Truth v. Kent School District, a case in which 
the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a similar 
nondiscrimination policy of a high school,69 the court concluded that 
SDSU’s nondiscrimination policy was viewpoint- and content-
neutral.70 
 
 62. Id. at 799. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 800. 
 66. Id. (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971, 2994 (2010). 
 67. Id. at 801. 
 68. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995)). 
 69. 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Los Angeles Cnty. v. 
Humphries, 131 S.Ct. 447 (2010). 
 70. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 803. 
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However, in its as-applied analysis of the statute, the court 
reasoned that a viewpoint neutral statute can still be unconstitutional 
if it is not uniformly applied.71 Noting that the university allowed 
recognition to other student groups whose practices appeared to 
violate the university’s nondiscrimination policy, the court reversed 
in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment.72 
C. Equal Protection and Free Exercise Claims 
Although this Note does not analyze these claims, it is worth 
observing here that the court briefly addressed the plaintiffs’ Equal 
Protection and Free Exercise claims and held that the plaintiffs had 
raised an issue of material fact regarding the discriminatory 
application of the nondiscrimination policy.73 
D. The Concurrence 
Judge Ripple concurred in the judgment for the sole reason that 
he felt that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Truth v. Kent commanded 
such a result.74 However, he expressed his personal disagreement 
with the result and argued that SDSU’s policy “marginalize[s] in the 
life of the institution those activities, practices and discourses that are 
religiously based.”75 Judge Ripple suggested that “at some later 
point, this case [would] be an appropriate case for further Supreme 
Court review.”76 Judge Ripple lamented the inability of students 
within protected categories to participate in student organizations, to 
“band together for mutual support and discourse.”77 “Homosexual 
students,” for example, “who have suffered discrimination or 
ostracism, may not both limit their membership to homosexuals and 
enjoy the benefits of official recognition.”78 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 804. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 805 (Ripple, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. at 806. 
 76. Id. at 805. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Reliance on Christian Legal Society 
1. The policies are not materially the same 
The Ninth Circuit’s attempt to grapple with Christian Legal 
Society is one of the most striking characteristics of Alpha Delta. On 
the one hand, the Ninth Circuit correctly acknowledged that its 
decision was not controlled by Christian Legal Society because the 
Supreme Court reserved for another day the precise question that 
the Ninth Circuit was asked to address: the constitutionality of a 
policy that allows discrimination except on certain prohibited bases.79 
But on the other hand, the Ninth Circuit claimed that Christian 
Legal Society supported its holding, concluding that, as a matter of 
constitutional principles, SDSU’s nondiscrimination policy is “not 
materially different from the content-neutral all-comers policy 
approved in Christian Legal Society” and that SDSU’s policy must 
therefore be upheld.80 
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Christian Legal Society was 
misplaced because the Supreme Court unmistakably and repeatedly 
distinguished the type of policy at issue in Alpha Delta—wherein a 
nondiscrimination policy applies only against a few groups—from the 
policy analyzed in Christian Legal Society, which applies to all 
groups. Although the Supreme Court declined for prudential reasons 
to rule on the constitutionality of a clubs policy like SDSU’s,81 the 
reasoning in the Supreme Court’s opinion suggests that—contrary to 
the Ninth Circuit’s assertion—such a policy is, constitutionally 
speaking, materially different. 
For example, the Court’s reasoning in Christian Legal Society 
regarding the viewpoint neutrality of the all-comers policy makes 
clear that it was constitutionally significant that the policy applied to 
all clubs. The Court noted that although the viewpoint-neutrality 
factor of limited public forum analysis typically was a “sticking point” 
in the Court’s earlier decisions, the Court reasoned that “we need 
not dwell on it” because “[i]t is, after all, hard to imagine a more 
 
 79. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of The Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 
2982–84 (2010); Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 795. 
 80. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 803. 
 81. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.10. 
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viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to 
accept all comers.”82 This reasoning suggests that the Court’s 
analysis would have been different, or at least more difficult, had the 
nondiscrimination policy required only some groups to accept 
everyone. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s reasons for distinguishing prior 
cases also suggests that the policy addressed by the Ninth Circuit is 
materially different from the one addressed by the Supreme Court. 
For example, the Supreme Court distinguished Healy v. James, 
Widmar v. Vincent, and Rosenberger—cases “in which universities 
singled out organizations for disfavored treatment because of their 
points of view”—by reasoning that “Hastings’ all-comers 
requirement draws no distinction between groups based on their 
message or perspective.”83 Moreover, in distinguishing a case that 
analyzed the constitutionality of a student-clubs policy that would 
allow students, by popular vote, to deny funding to a group, the 
Christian Legal Society Court noted that Hastings’s “all-comers 
policy governs all [clubs]; Hastings does not pick and choose which 
organizations must comply with the policy on the basis of 
viewpoint.”84 After making these distinctions, the Court concluded 
that the all-comers policy in Christian Legal Society was “textbook 
viewpoint neutral.”85 Therefore, the “all-comers” nature of the 
Hastings policy was a strong distinguishing characteristic in 
Christian Legal Society, and thus was constitutionally significant to 
the Court. SDSU’s policy cannot claim these saving principles 
because it singles out groups for disfavored treatment and does not 
govern all clubs. 
One final element of Christian Legal Society shows that the 
Supreme Court likely viewed it as constitutionally significant that the 
nondiscrimination policy was applied to all student clubs. In its 
opinion, the Supreme Court elected not to analyze Hastings’s as-
written nondiscrimination policy, which is similar to SDSU’s policy 
because it prohibits “discrimination on several enumerated bases, 
including religion and sexual orientation.”86 The dissent and 
 
 82. Id. at 2993. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 2994 n.25. 
 85. Id. at 2993. 
 86. Id. at 2982. 
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concurrence analyzed the as-written policy, and the plaintiff urged 
the Supreme Court to analyze the as-written policy.87 Instead, the 
Supreme Court analyzed only the school’s enforcement of the policy, 
in which all student groups were required to adopt an all-comers 
policy, or in other words, to “allow any student to participate, 
become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, 
regardless of [her] status or beliefs.”88 The Court spent a significant 
portion of its opinion defending its choice to address the all-comers 
policy rather than the as-written policy.89 If the two policies were 
materially the same, it would not have made sense for the Court to 
devote so much of its opinion to defending its decision to analyze 
one or the other. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s choice to reserve 
for another day the question of the constitutionality of a selective 
nondiscrimination policy90 is also strong evidence that the Supreme 
Court saw the policy as being constitutionally different, or at least 
different enough to raise constitutional or precedential issues. Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit erred in its confident assertion that SDSU’s 
nondiscrimination policy was not materially different than Hastings’s 
policy.  
2. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Truth was sufficient authority 
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Christian Legal Society is also 
odd because it was unnecessary. The Ninth Circuit could have relied 
solely on its own precedent in reaching its result. In an earlier 
decision, Truth v. Kent School District, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of a similar nondiscrimination policy adopted by a 
high school.91 Truth would have provided sufficient foundation for 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision, but the panel apparently wanted to 
buttress its reasoning with Supreme Court precedent in addition to 
Ninth Circuit precedent. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit, given the clear 
reasoning quoted above, viewed Christian Legal Society as raising 
some question as to the constitutional soundness of Truth, and 
 
 87. Id. at 3000–01 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2995 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 
2982 (majority opinion). 
 88. Id. at 2983 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 89. Id. at 2982–84. 
 90. Id. at 2984 n.10. 
 91. 542 F.3d 634, 639–40 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Los Angeles 
Cnty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010). 
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therefore the Ninth Circuit felt compelled to harmonize the 
decisions. If this explanation is accurate, however, the Ninth Circuit 
failed to adequately address the Supreme Court’s strong reasoning 
suggesting that these policies are constitutionally different. 
B. SDSU’s Nondiscrimination Policy Is Not Viewpoint-Neutral 
The Ninth Circuit erred in determining that SDSU’s 
nondiscrimination policy was viewpoint neutral. The court failed to 
adequately consider the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, wherein the Supreme 
Court held that the university engaged in viewpoint discrimination 
by withholding, on the basis of student publishers’ religious views, 
funding that was available to all other student publishers.92 In 
Rosenberger, the University of Virginia allowed student groups to 
obtain reimbursements for the printing costs of various student 
publications.93 The university denied a reimbursement request by a 
Christian student publication because of the university program’s 
prohibition on any activity that “primarily promotes or manifests a 
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”94 The 
Court reasoned that “[t]he government must abstain from 
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the 
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the 
restriction.”95 
Although the policy in Rosenberger was arguably viewpoint 
neutral, the Court held that it was not viewpoint neutral because 
“the University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but 
selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with 
religious editorial viewpoints.”96 In doing so, the Court relied upon 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, which 
held that a school district engaged in viewpoint discrimination by 
opening its facilities to the general public on wide-ranging issues and 
then denying that benefit to a group because of its religious views.97 
Quoting Lamb’s Chapel, the Court reasoned: “[I]t discriminates on 
 
 92. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995). 
 93. Id. at 823–24. 
 94. Id. at 825 (quoting the school’s policy). 
 95. Id. at 829. 
 96. Id. at 831. 
 97. Id. at 830. 
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the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the 
presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except 
those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint.”98 
Likewise, SDSU’s program constitutes impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination. As in Rosenberger, SDSU provides various benefits to 
students, including the ability to discriminate in membership.99 For 
example, the student-republican club can discriminate against non-
republicans in its membership. Under the reasoning of Rosenberger, 
SDSU’s policy is viewpoint discriminatory because the university 
allows student groups to discriminate in membership except where 
the university disagrees with “the specific motivating ideology or the 
opinion or perspective of the speaker.”100 Put another way, the 
university allows discrimination in membership so long as the 
university agrees with the group’s discriminatory ideology or 
opinion. This is impermissible viewpoint discrimination under 
Rosenberger, and the Ninth Circuit failed to attempt to reconcile its 
reasoning with Rosenberger. 
SDSU’s policy is in some ways similar to the viewpoint-
discriminatory ordinance in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., which, 
according to Justice Scalia, allowed fighting words expressed by 
those in favor of racial, gender, and sexual-orientation equality, but 
punished fighting words expressed by those who disagreed with 
those aims.101 Likewise, SDSU allows discriminatory membership 
practices by groups with whom the university agrees, but punishes 
discriminatory membership practices when exercised by those with 
whom the university disagrees. Justice Scalia reasoned in R.A.V. that 
the city has “no such authority to license one side of a debate to 
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of 
Queensberry rules.”102 This reasoning applies to SDSU with equal 
force. 
 
 98. Id. (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
393 (1993)). 
 99. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 100. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
 101. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992). 
 102. Id. at 392. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion fails to adequately address 
Rosenberger, and the court erroneously held that SDSU’s policy was 
viewpoint neutral. The court also erred in attempting to leverage 
Christian Legal Society as supporting authority because the Supreme 
Court strongly distinguished the type of policy at issue in Alpha 
Delta. This decision is a success for university administrators, since a 
contrary holding—that the Christian clubs’ right of free speech was 
violated by the policy—would likely mean that the university could 
not enforce the nondiscrimination policy at all. However, the 
decision fails to adequately protect the constitutional freedoms of 
university students. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s assertion, the 
Christian clubs in this case were not merely “incidentally 
burden[ed]”103 by SDSU’s policy; the clubs were purposely excluded 
from the forum by the policy. Judge Ripple rightly observed in his 
concurrence that the “net result of this selective policy is therefore to 
marginalize in the life of the institution those activities, practices and 
discourses that are religiously based.”104 
Devin Snow* 
 
 
 
 103. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 801. 
 104. Id. at 806 (Ripple, J., concurring). 
  J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
